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Abstract: This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by 
the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the 
distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium wages across countries and 
equilibrium prices. These in turn influence the equilibrium number of firms. From the 
social planner's perspective, optimal tax rates are harmonized, providing the optimal 
number of firms, and set such that income is efficiently distributed between private and 
public consumption. As is common in tax competition models, in the Nash equilibrium 
tax rates are inefficiently low, yielding underprovision of public goods. Furthermore, 
there exist a variety of situations in which equilibrium tax rates differ. As a result, too 
many firms enter the market as governments compete to be the low-tax, high-wage 
country. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and provides an additional 
benefit from tax harmonization. 
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1. Introduction 
  One of the most important recent innovations to the literature on international 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) has incorporated heterogeneous firms into 
models of imperfect competition that previously assumed identical firms.
1 We build upon 
these innovations by incorporating imperfectly competitive heterogeneous firms and 
endogenous entry into a general equilibrium model of tax competition for mobile 
investment. Although a handful of tax competition models with imperfect competition 
exist, firms in these models are identical and their number is exogenous.
2 In our model, 
firms differ in their labor productivity. Because of this, low productivity firms will prefer 
a low cost location even if this has a greater profit tax. Furthermore, the last firm to enter 
will enter only in the low cost location. Nevertheless, governments still have an incentive 
to lower taxes as this attracts more profitable firms and raises the real value of local 
wages. This race to the bottom in taxes leads to the well-known result of public good 
underprovision. However, in many equilibrium outcomes, it also leads to an 
overabundance of firms. When too many firms enter, this creates a new inefficiency from 
tax competition, one that hurts welfare by raising consumer prices such that any gains 
from additional varieties are wiped out. This provides a new motivation for tax 
harmonization. 
  Our use of discrete yet endogenously entering firms is a departure from the 
standard models of tax competition.
3 Typically, one of two approaches is used. The first 
assumes that investors divide their activities is across locations. Since each location has 
                                                 
1 Examples in the trade literature include Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Melitz (2003). Examples in the 
FDI literature include Nocke and Yeaple (2005), Yeaple (2005), and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). 
2 Examples include Ferrett and Wooton (2005), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Janeba (1998). 
3 Wilson (1999), Gresik (2001), and Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2003) provide overviews of the existing 
literature.   2 
diminishing marginal returns, even with tax differentials each location receives positive 
investment levels.
4 We call this the "continuous investment" approach. The second 
approach assumes a given number of firms (typically one) for which governments 
compete. Here, firms choose a single location meaning that countries that do not host 
have no investment. We call this the "discrete investment" approach.
5  
These modeling assumptions have important implications for strategic behavior 
and the ability to include public goods in the model. When investment is discrete, 
competition for the firm amounts to a second price auction in which governments bid 
their own value for the firm but the winner only pays the second highest value.
6 This 
leads to a best response in which governments marginally undercut one another's taxes 
until all gains from hosting are exhausted. In contrast, when investment is continuous, 
optimal taxes trade off against the size of the tax base and the share of profits collected 
by the host government. Thus, there is not the weakly dominant strategy found in the 
discrete investment case. A key implication of this difference is that it is often impossible 
to include a necessary public good in the discrete investment case because there typically 
exist equilibria in which some countries do not host FDI and therefore collect no tax 
revenue. Thus, while both approaches predict a race to the bottom in taxes, only the 
continuous investment model can be used to describe the inefficiencies tax competition 
causes for public goods provision. In our model, however, due to the heterogeneity in 
their productivities, not all firms flock to the low tax location.
7 Thus even though a single 
                                                 
4 Wilson (1984) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1984) are seminal papers in this vein. 
5 Recent examples include Haufler and Wooton (1999, 2006) and Raff (2004). 
6 See Black and Hoyt (1989) or Davies and Ellis (forthcoming) for detailed discussions of this second price 
auction result. 
7 This is in contrast to Baldwin and Krugman (2004) in which mobile firms all agglomerate in one location 
or the other depending on relative tax rates.   3 
firm's location is discrete, each government collects positive tax revenues from the firms 
in equilibrium. Therefore, we are able to discuss public goods provision in a model with 
discrete investment. 
  As in the continuous investment and discrete investment models, we also find a 
race to the bottom when taxes are set non-cooperatively. This occurs because countries 
find it strictly beneficial to host the high productivity firms because these are the most 
profitable. To win such firms, a government must set a tax rate lower than the others. 
Furthermore, once a nation is set to host these productive firms, it has an incentive to set 
an even lower tax in order to encourage entry in the other country which increases the 
number of varieties, attracts even more firms to itself, and drives up its own wages. 
Although this race to the bottom is tempered by the need to raise taxes and provide for a 
public good, it is nevertheless the case that taxes are inefficiently low and the public good 
is underprovided. In addition, there are many equilibrium situations in which countries' 
taxes are unequal. This is because the low tax country, by attracting firms to itself lowers 
overseas wages and raises prices (part of which must be borne by overseas consumers). 
This externality leads to an overabundance of varieties and creates a new inefficiency 
from tax competition, one that has not been explored in the literature. Furthermore, this 
excessive entry provides a new motivation for tax harmonization. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the baseline model. Section 3 
describes the properties of the Nash equilibria. Section 4 solves the social planner's 
problem. Section 5 considers the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions, 
including the presence of vertical FDI. Section 6 concludes. 
   4 
2. The Model 
  In this section, we present the basic framework of our model. Consider a world 
with two countries labeled A and B. Each country k has a fixed labor endowment given 
by  k L  which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let  A B L L ³ . The 
sequence of moves is the following. First, the two countries simultaneously set their tax 
rates. Second, firms simultaneously choose which of the countries to locate in and how 
much to produce. Finally, consumption occurs and payoffs accrue. As is standard, we 
apply subgame perfection.  
2.1 Consumers 
  Utility from private consumption of the representative consumer in country k is of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz form: 
 








- -  
=  
  ∫   (1) 
where N is the number of varieties and  1 s > . Denote pre-tax private income in country k 
k I . Pre-tax private income is the sum of wage income and pre-tax profits of firms that are 
located in country k (more on this below).
8 This is taxed at a rate  k t , thus the same tax 
rate is applied to wage income and profits.
9 Consumers then maximize utility subject to 
their budget constraint: 
 
0
( ) ( ) (1 )
N
k k k p i x i di t I £ - ∫ . 
                                                 
8 Note that this means we are not considering "outside firms", i.e. those coming from a third country. 
Examples of this literature include Davies (2005) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). 
9 What if tax rates differ?   5 
As is well-known, the solution to this problem yields a demand function for private 
consumers for each firm of: 
 
1 ( ) ( ) (1 ) k k k x i P p i t I
s s - - = -  














  ∫ .  (2) 
Tax revenues are used by the government to fund public consumption of these 
same N goods where the relative valuation of is the same as those given by the 
consumer’s utility function, i.e. the government maximizes a function: 
 








- -  
=  
  ∫ .  (3) 
The government of each country must run a balanced budget, i.e.: 
 
0
( ) ( )
N
k k k p i g i di t I £ ∫ . 
One interpretation of government consumption is that the tax revenues are used to 
support consumption by individuals without income (such as the unemployed or the 
elderly). Alternatively, this government consumption can represent the consumption of a 
corrupt government official of the type common in the Leviathan models of taxation.
10 A 
third interpretation of this is that it represents the government's transformation of the N 
products into a publicly-provided good. Regardless of the interpretation, government 
consumption in country k results in a country k public demand for each firm of: 
 
1 ( ) ( ) k k k g i P p i t I
s s - - =  
implying that total demand for each firm from country k is: 
                                                 
10 Examples of this include Brennan and Buchanan (1980) and Edwards and Keen (1996).   6 
 
1 ( ) ( ) k k X i P p i I
s s - - = . 
We assume that there is no price discrimination between countries (which is guaranteed 
by free resale and an assumption of zero trade costs).
11  Thus, the firm’s worldwide 
demand is: 
 
1 ( ) ( ) X i P p i I
s s - - =  
where  A B I I I = + . 
2.2 Firms 
  A given firm i makes two choices. First it decides in which country to locate (or 
to not enter at all).
12 Second, if it does enter, it decides how much to produce. Firms make 
these decisions simultaneously, i.e. taking the location and output of other firms as given. 
As is also standard, firms take wages as given. Firm i’s after-tax profits when based in 
country k are given by: 
  [ ] ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k k k k i t p i q i w a i q i w F p = - - -   (4) 
where  k t  is again the income tax in country k,  k w  is the wage rate in country k,  ( ) q i  is 
firm i’s output,  ( ) a i  is firm i's exogenously endowed productivity parameter and F  is 
the amount of labor firm i requires to cover fixed costs. As in other models of firm 
heterogeneity, this productivity parameter drives the differences across firms.
13 We 
                                                 
11 If trade costs are positive, this increases the desirability of locating in the country with the greater income 
as this is where more of the firm’s output will be sold. As shown by Haufler and Wooten (1999) in a model 
with a single firm, this gives an advantage to this larger economy in the tax competition game. Similarly, 
this would give an advantage to this country in our model. 
12 A useful conceptualization of the model is to attribute a given firm's productivity to an internationally 
mobile entrepreneur. This entrepreneur earns rents from this firm-specific asset, i.e. entrepreneurial income 
amounts to firm's profits. Given a country of residence, an entrepreneur then becomes a part of that 
country's representative consumer which under this preference structure implies that entrepreneurial 
income, demand, and welfare then enter the model consistent with the above formulation. 
13 In an earlier version of the paper (Davies and Eckel, 2007), we consider a variant of the model where 
productivity is the same across firms but they differ in the labor requirement for the fixed cost. The results 
are qualitatively identical to those presented here.    7 
assume that this parameter is increasing in the index, i.e.  (0) ( ) ( ) a a i a j < <  for 0 i j < <  
implying that firm 0 is the most productive firm. We assume that 
{ } min , A B F L L < ensuring that either country is capable of hosting at least one firm with 
labor remaining for positive production.
14 Given a location, profit maximization implies 
that: 
 
( 1) ( ) ( )
( 1)






=   -  
  (5) 
yielding a markup over marginal cost: 
  ( ) ( )
( 1)





.  (6) 
This condition allows us to rewrite profits so that at their maximum: 
  [ ]
1
( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
( 1)
k k k i t w a i q i F p s
s
= - - -
-
  (7) 
where, for this firm's market to clear, its quantity  ( ) k q i  equals its worldwide demand 
( ) k X i . For future use, it is important to note that by (5): 
  ( )
( 1) ( ) ( )
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  (8) 
that is, a firm's labor demand is falling in its index. 
  In order to more easily describe the distribution of firms and derive best response 
tax rates, it is useful to make a distinction between the high-tax country and the low-tax 
country. We will label our countries such that  1 2 t t £  and refer to country 1 as the low tax 
                                                 
14 It is important to recognize that our firms are not multinationals according to the standard definition 
because they have their headquarters (where the fixed cost takes place) and their production in the same 
country. We consider the case of multinationals in Section 5.   8 
country.
15 If  1 2 t t <  and  1 2 w w £ , all firms will locate in country 1 since this location 
offers both lower taxes and lower costs. As described in detail below, this is incompatible 
with endogenous wages since it implies an excess labor supply in country 2. Thus 1 2 w w ³  
with strict equality only if  1 2 t t = . Additional implications are that  1 2 p p ³  and  1 2 q q £ . 






q º £  which holds with equality only when taxes 
are equal.
16 
  With free entry, firms enter until the last firm earns zero profits by doing so. This 
last firm is firm N. Whenever taxes are unequal, we find that: 
  1 2 ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) a N q F N a N q F N s s - - < - -  
implying that pre-tax profits are greater for this firm in the low-cost country 2. Although 
country 2 has a higher tax rate, since firm N earns no profits, this is not a deterrent. Note 
that since this firm earns zero profits, in equilibrium: 
  2 ( ) ( ) ( 1) . a N q N F s = -   (9) 
Using (5) for a generic firm i producing in country 2 and (9), we see that: 
 
1
2( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) . q i a i a N F
s s s
- - = -   (10) 
Since all other firms have strictly lower production costs for the same quantity, if they 
were to enter country 2, they would earn positive profits (and potentially even higher 
profits by entering country 1). Taking the ratio of the quantity solutions of a given firm in 
countries 1 and 2 and using (10), allows us to derive that for a given firm i: 
                                                 
15 Note that whether country A or B corresponds to country 1 depends on their relative taxes. The purpose 
behind this distinction is to ease the derivation of the best responses for countries A and B. 
16 The potential for different wages does not exist in Baldwin and Krugman (2004) because of an 
additional, freely traded good produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.   9 
 
1
1 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) q i q i a i a N F
s s s q s
- - = = - .  (11) 
An important aspect of this solution is that, unlike monopolistic competition with 
identical technologies across firms, in our setting only the last firm to enter has zero 
profits. Therefore, because of the heterogeneous productivities, profit taxes have the 
ability to influence firm location even with free entry. In addition, when tax rates differ, 
there exists a firm l  that is indifferent between the two countries. Specifically, this firm 
is given by: 
  [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)
( 1) ( 1)
t w a q F t w a q F l l s l l s
s s
- - - = - - -
- -













 and using (11): 
 
1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a N a a N a
s s s s s q l tq l
- - - -     - = -    .  (13) 
This implies that whenever tax rates differ that there is a distribution of firms such that 
firms 0 to l  locate in country 1 and l  to N locate in country 2. This is represented 
graphically in Figure 1. Intuitively, the firms that use the least labor (high productivity 
firms) seek out the location with the lowest taxes (country 1) whereas those for whom 
wages costs are relatively more important (low productivity firms) seek out the lowest 
wage rate (country 2). Firms with index numbers higher than N do not enter. Note that 
this leads to an agglomeration of relatively productive firms in one country and relatively 
unproductive firms in the other. This is not, however, due to spillovers across firms but 
due to the fact that country 1 has a comparative advantage in "tax avoidance" due to its 
comparatively low tax rate whereas country 2 has a comparative advantage in production 
by virtue of its relatively low wages. 
2.3 Labor Markets and Income   10 
In order to clear the labor market in each country, wages must adjust so that labor 
supply equals labor demand. As noted above, if country 1 has both lower taxes and 
(weakly) lower wages, all firms will locate there. This would lead to an excess supply of 
labor in country 2, pushing  2 w  down. As a result, if  1 2 t t £  labor markets in the two 
countries will clear only if  2 1 w w £  with strict equality only when taxes are equal. Adding 
up across the firms that country 1 hosts, equilibrium in country 1's labor market requires: 
  1 1
0
( ) ( ) L a j q j dj F
l
l = + ∫ , 




( ) ( ) a j dj
l
s m l l
- - º ∫ . Thus, dropping the argument of 
1 m  we can write: 
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1 1 ( 1) ( ) L Fa N F
s s lq s m l
- = - +   (14) 
where 
1
1 ( 1) ( ) Fa N
s s q s m
- -  is the average labor used in production by a firm in country 
1. 
Similarly, defining  ( )
1 1
2( , ) ( )
N




- - = - ∫ , in country 2: 
  ( )
1
2 2 ( ) ( 1) ( ) L N a N F N F
s l s m l
- = - - + -   (15) 
where 
1
2 ( ) ( 1) a N F
s s m
- -  is the average amount of production labor used by its firms. 
This then also allows us to write equilibrium values of income and the price index: 
 
1
1 1 1 ( ) I w F a N
s s l q sm
- = ,  (16) 
  ( )
1
2 2 2 ( ) I w N a N F
s l sm
- = - ,  (17) 
and   11 
  ( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1 2 ( 1)
P w N
s s s
lm l q m
s
- - = + -
-
.  (18) 
2.4 Comparative Statics 
  We now have a system of three equilibrium equations, one describing the 
location-indifferent firm l ((13)) and two describing labor market equilibria ((14) and 
(15)). We also have three endogenous variables, the index number of the indifferent 
firml , the number of firms N, and relative wages q . Using this system of equations, we 
can derive how these variables move with the relative tax variable t . 
 
Lemma 1: The index of the indifferent firm and the number of firms are decreasing in t . 
Relative wages are increasing in t . 
  
 
Proof: By direct calculation: 
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and 
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where   12 
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                      Q.E.D. 
The intuition behind these comparative statics is straightforward. Suppose that  1 t  rises, 
implying an increase int . This rise will lead the initially indifferent firm to strictly prefer 
country 2. As a result, the indifferent firm’s index falls. This shift in firms towards 
country 2 increases labor demand there, thereby increasing country 2’s relative wage q . 
This rise in costs in country 2 means that the firm that previously just covered its costs 
now has negative profits, leading it to exit and N to fall. 
2.5 The Distribution of Firms under Equal Taxes 
  One difficulty with the above analysis is that when taxes are equal, wages must 
also be equal, otherwise all firms will flock to one location or the other. The difficulty 
this presents is that at this point, all firms are indifferent between locations. As such, 
there exist many distributions of the firms across the two locations that are consistent 
with this equilibrium besides those in which firms agglomerate according to their 
productivity. Furthermore, even if we use a distribution such that firms zero to l  locate 
in one country and the remainder locate in the other, there is no obvious way to assign the 
high productivity firms to one country or the other. Therefore we make the assumption 
that when tax rates are equal, country A hosts firms zero to l  with probability b  and 
firms l  to N with probability 1 b - . 
  It will be useful to establish certain results regarding the distribution of firms in 
the equal tax case.    13 
 
Proposition 1: Assume equal taxes. Then: 
a)  Regardless of which country hosts the high productivity firms, N remains the 
same.  
b)  If A has more labor than B, then when A hosts the high (low) productivity firms it 
hosts more firms in equilibrium than when B hosts the high (low) productivity 
firms. 
c)  A country hosts more firms when hosting the low productivity firms than when it 
hosts the high productivity firms. 
d)  If A hosts the low productivity firms then it hosts more firms in equilibrium than B 
does. 
e)  When a country hosts the high productivity firms, more labor is devoted to 
production than when it hosts the low productivity firms. 
f)  When endowments are equal, the country hosting the high productivity firms hosts 
fewer firms in equilibrium than the other country does. 
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i.e. the total number of firms is the same regardless of whether the relatively large A hosts 
the low or the high productivity firms. Denote this number of firms
* N . 
  Although 
* N  is independent of who hosts the low fixed costs firms, l  is not. 
When country A hosts the high productivity firms the number it hosts is 
*
A l , where:   14 
 
*
* 1 1 *
0
( 1) ( ) ( )
A
A A L a N F a j dj F
l
s s s l
- - = - + ∫ . 
Similarly, when country B hosts the high productivity firms the number it hosts is 
*




* 1 1 *
0
( 1) ( ) ( )
B
B B L a N F a j dj F
l
s s s l
- - = - + ∫ . 
Since  A B L L ³  and  ( ) a i is increasing in i, this implies that: 
 
* *
A B l l ³   (22) 
with strict equality only when endowments are equal. This means that in equilibrium A 
would host at least as many high productivity firms as B would. This in turn implies that: 
 
* * * *
B A N N l l - ³ -   (23) 
with strict equality only when endowments are equal. This implies that in equilibrium A 
would host at least as many low productivity firms as B would.  
Since by (8) a firm's total labor demand is decreasing in its index, the average 
firm in country 2 uses less labor than the average firm in country 1 does. As a result, 
when a given country k hosts the low productivity firms, it must host more firms than 
when it hosts the high productivity firms in order to exhaust its labor supply, i.e.  
 
* * *
k k N l l- < -   (24) 
Combining (22) through (24) implies that because B is no larger than A, when B hosts the 
high productivity firms, it hosts fewer firms that A does. An additional implication of (24) 
is that the amount of labor devoted to production is greater when a country hosts the high 
productivity firms:  
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * *
1 2 , k k k k N N l m l l m l - > - .  (25)   15 
Furthermore, when countries have equal endowments, this implies that where 
* * *
A B l l l = = : 
  ( )
* * * * 1 * * *
2 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1) 0 N a N N
s l l s l m l m
-   - - = - - - <   .  (26) 
       Q.E.D. 
2.6 Government Objectives 
  The government of country k maximizes a national welfare function that depends 
on the utility derived from private consumption and that derived by government 
consumption. Specifically, national welfare in country k is given by: 
  ( )
(1 ) , k k k k k v t t U G
a a -
- =   (27) 
One interpretation of this function is of that of a representative consumer who derives 
utility from their own private consumption and a publicly-provided good created by a 
production function given by (3). Alternatively, this can represent a function that weights 
the utility of income-earners relative to that of those consuming out of tax revenues (be 
they the unemployed or Leviathan government officials). Defining 
(1 )(1 ) k k k T t t
a a - = - , 
and using the above results for quantities and prices, when tax rates differ we can write 
country 1’s indirect national welfare as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1 ( ) v T N a N F
s s s s s lm q l m lq m
- - - = - + -   (28) 
while that for country 2 is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
2 2 1 2 2 ( 1) ( ) v T N N a N F
s s s s lm q l m l q m
- - - = - + - - .  (29) 
Inspection of these shows that if a country’s tax rate equals 1 or 0, regardless of the other 
country’s tax rate, national welfare is zero because all income is allocated to the public or   16 
private sector. For a given pair of tax rates  1 2 k t t t = = , recall that country k has a 
probability b  of receiving the high productivity firms. Thus, its expected utility is: 
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  = - + - -      
  ∫ (30) 
where the term in brackets is proportional to the expected amount of labor used in 
production in country k. Since a country hosts fewer firms when hosting the high 
productivity firms than when hosting low productivity firms, this implies that labor 
dedicated to production is greater when hosting the high productivity firms. Thus, for any 
( ) 1 2 0,1 t t t = = Î ,   ( ) ( ) ( )
*
2 1 , , , k v t t v t t v t t < <  i.e. when taxes are equal national income 
and national welfare are greater when hosting the high productivity firms. 
 
3. Nash Equilibrium Taxes 
  With the framework now laid out, we are now ready to derive the best responses 
for the two countries A and B. To do so, we will begin by examining a country’s behavior 
assuming that it is the low-tax country 1. We will then examine behavior assuming that it 
is the high-tax country 2. Finally, we will combine the results from each of these to 
derive the best response for each country A and B. 
3.1 Best Response for Country 1 
  To derive country 1’s best response, first suppose that  1 2 t t < . Looking at how 
country 1’s welfare (28) moves in t , using the comparative statics (19), (20), and (21) 
we see that:   17 
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Evaluating this at  1 t =  yields: 
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  (33) 
indicating that, ignoring the distribution of income between private and public 
consumption, country 1 has a dominant strategy of undercutting country 2’s tax rate.  
The full effect of  1 t  on  1 v , however, must also take into account the effect of  1 t  on 
the distribution of income. Therefore the actual first-order condition for country 1 is: 
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In order to understand the best response function  1 2 ( ) t t this implies, it is useful to consider 
two values of  2 t . First, when  2 1 t = ,  0 t = , implying that no matter what tax rate country 
1 chooses it cannot affect the distribution of firms. In this case, (34) dictates that country 
1 will set  1(1) 1 t a = - , i.e. it will efficiently allocate income between the public and   18 
private sectors. The intuition behind this is that when  2 1 t = , country 1 has no incentive to 
use its tax to affect firm location. Thus, it uses it purely to achieve the desired income 
allocation. One item of note is that in this case, since taxes differ, country 1 is indeed the 
high wage country and, as any positive profit firm will flee country 2 for country 1, 
country 2 hosts only one firm (firm N). 
  The second point to consider is the value of  2 t  such that if country 1 knew that it 
would host the low fixed costs firms with certainty that it would be content to match this 
tax rate. Denote this tax rate  2 t  which is specifically given for country k by: 
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where G is a function of 
*
k l  and 
* N . Note that  2 1 k t a < - . At this  2 k t , although it would 
be beneficial for 1 to reduce  1 t  below  2 k t  in terms of affecting t , this would cause too 
great a distortion to the distribution of income. However, if this country actually set its 
tax rate equal to that of the other, it would not know for certain that it would receive the 
low fixed cost firms. Instead, it would receive an expected income level  ( )
*
2 2 , k k k v t t  
which is strictly less than  ( ) 1 2 2 , k k v t t . Thus, actually matching creates a discrete fall in 
income. An alternative way of recognizing this is to look at the relative income of being 
country 1 versus that of country 2 when taxes are equal. The ratio of (16) and (17) at this 
point is:   19 
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  (36) 
by (25).  Therefore, at this point country 1 will prefer to set its tax rate marginally below 
that for country 2, creating a marginal loss in welfare due to the underprovision of the 
public good but gaining a discrete benefit to expected welfare by guaranteeing that it 
hosts high productivity firms. Thus, country 1’s best response is such that  1 2 2 ( ) t t t £  with 
equality only when  2 0 t = . Graphically, this looks as in Figure 2 where for values of 
2 2 t t £  the best response lies just to the left of the 45° line. Note that we have not proven 
the exact shape of the portion above this point however the graph matches results from 
simulations of specific examples.
17 However, it is straightforward to show that given the 
strict convexity of the preferences, that for each value of  2 t there is a unique value of 
1 2 ( ) t t  corresponding to it implying that the best response does not bend backwards. 
  This desire to undercut the other nation's tax is comparable to that found in 
models where governments compete over discrete firms. In that class of models, there is a 
discrete change in welfare generated by undercutting the other country's tax as this 
guarantees the winning of the firm. A similar motivation is found here. Unlike those 
models, however, there is also a desire to strictly undercut the other country in order to 
increase wages and attract more firms. Thus, even though the endogenous variables in 
our model move continuously, this leads to a dominant strategy not found in models 
where investment is continuously distributed (i.e. where a country internalizes the 
tradeoff between tax rates and the tax base). 
3.2 Best Response for Country 2 
                                                 
17 Details on these are available upon request.   20 
  As when we derived the best response for country 1, we initially consider the 
effect of t  on country 2’s welfare. Here, we find that: 
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which, evaluated at  1 2 t t =  reduces to: 
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  (39) 
this implies that country 2 will lower its tax until it matches that of country 1. Looking at 
the total impact of  2 t  on  2 v , we find that: 
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(40) 
As before, it is instructive to consider the best response  2 1 ( ) t t at two key values of  1 t . 
First, when  1 0 t = , if country 2 matches this tax it devotes no income to the public sector. 
The first term then goes to negative infinity implying that this is not a best response.   21 
However, if country 2 allocates income efficiently by setting  2 1 t a = - , the first term 
goes to zero while the second is negative, imply that this is also not a best response. Thus 
2 0 (0) 1 t a < < - . 
  Next, similar to country 1’s  2 t , there exists a value of  1 t  denoted by  1 t %  such that 
if country 2 knew for sure that it would receive the low productivity firms its first order 
condition equals zero by setting  1 1 2( ) t t t = % % . Specifically, for country k:  
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where G is a function of 
* N  and 
*
k l- . Note that this is less than 1 a - . 
  In practice, however, once country 2 matches its tax rate to that of country 1, it 
receives a discrete boost in expected income since it now has a positive probability of 
receiving the high productivity firms. Because of this, there is a strict income advantage 
to matching tax rates at this point. Therefore there will exist a tax rate  1k t $  by country 1 
for which country 2 is in fact indifferent between having a higher tax rate with its 
superior allocation of income and an equal tax rate with a higher expected income level. 
Given the above discussion, it follows that  1 1 0 k k t t < < $ % . For values of  1 t  beyond this point 
country 2’s best response is to match its tax to that of country 1. Thus, country 2’s best 
response is characterized by  2 1 1 ( ) t t t ³  with strict inequality only when  1 1 k t t < $ . 
Graphically, this is illustrated by Figure 3 where again strict concavity of preferences 
rules out a backwards-bending best response. 
3.3 Equilibrium with Identical Countries   22 
  In order to determine the Nash equilibria, it is necessary to derive the best 
responses for the countries A and B by utilizing the above results for countries 1 and 2. In 
this section, we consider the case of identical countries where  A B L L = . 
First, consider the case of country A. When  0 B t = , country A will find it desirable 
to set a strictly higher tax rate and allocate some income to the public sector. When 
1 B t = , however, country A will choose to set a strictly smaller tax rate (in fact one equal 
to 1 a - ). Thus, for low values of  B t  country A will choose to be the high tax country 2 
whereas for high values of  B t  it will choose to be the low tax country 1. A comparable 
intuition underlies country B’s best response.  
The challenge in describing country A’s best response lies in finding the point at 
which the switch occurs. When  1A B t t = $  for country A, we know that A is indifferent 
between maintaining a tax rate higher than  1A t $  and matching tax rates if it is unable to 
lower its tax further. However, it can indeed lower its tax further and, given the 
discussion for country 1, it will find it desirable to do so as this guarantees that it receives 
the high productivity firms. Thus, country A’s indifference is in fact between having a 
strictly higher tax rate or a strictly smaller tax rate. Therefore, the jump in country A’s 
best response will happen when B's tax rate is  1 1 A B A t t t = < $  implying that there exist two 
optimal tax rates at this point, i.e.  { } 1 ( ) , A A A A t t t t =  where  1 A A A t t t < < . The only 
remaining question is whether  A t  is marginally less than  1 A t  or discretely so, that is 
whether  1 2 A A t t <  from A’s perspective. 
   23 
Lemma 2: When countries are identical,  1 1 2 2 A B A B t t t t = < = . 
 
Proof: With identical countries, 
* *
A B l l = . Thus, comparing (35) and (41), we see that the 
difference between  1k t  and  1k t %  is the first has  ( )
* *
1 k k l m l  in its denominator whereas the 
second has ( ) ( )
* * * *
2 , k k N N l m l - . Since, by (25)  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * *
1 2 , k k k k N N l m l l m l > - , this 
implies that   1 2 k k t t > % . Therefore that point at which the jump in the country 2 best 
response occurs (i.e.  1 A t )  is before the country 1 best response moves discretely away 
from the 45° line. This implies that country A’s best response appears as that in Figure 4. 
Given the symmetry between countries, the same ranking holds for country B.   Q.E.D. 
   This best response combines features of those found in both the continuous and 
discrete investment models. When B's tax rate is moderate, the dominant factor in A's 
decision making is the effect of its tax rate on the distribution of firms. As a result, as in 
the discrete investment models it chooses to undercut B's tax. However, when B's tax rate 
is very high or very low, A becomes far more cognizant of the tradeoff between the tax 
base and the allocation of income between sectors. This then leads to behavior 
comparable to that found in the continuous investment models.  
We can now describe the Nash equilibrium for identical countries. 
 
Proposition 2: When countries are identical, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies. Furthermore, no equilibrium outcomes involve efficient public good 
provision. 
 
   24 
Proof: Combining the two best responses together as in Figure 5, by Lemma 2 it is clear 
that there does not exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This is because for each 
country, the highest tax rate at which it is willing to be the discretely high tax country ( 1 t ) 
is less than the lowest tax rate for which the other is willing to be the discretely low tax 
country ( 2 t ). Thus, best responses do not cross and the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria) 
must be in mixed strategies. 
Furthermore, any mixed strategy equilibrium has two properties. First, there are 
equilibrium outcomes that occur with positive probability under which  A B t t ¹ , i.e. for 
which  1 t < . Second, since neither country sets its tax equal to one with a positive 
probability, the other country assigns no positive probability to choosing a tax equal to 
1 a - . Thus, regardless of the equilibrium outcome, the public good is underprovided. 
Q.E.D. 
3.4 Equilibrium with Asymmetric Countries 
  Now, assume that country A has a strictly greater labor endowment than country 
B. Given the above discussion, it is still clear that no pure strategy equilibrium exists for 
which taxes are equal since both A and B would have an incentive to lower their taxes (at 
least marginally) in order to capture the high productivity firms. Also comparable to the 
symmetric case, any equilibrium outcome will be such that taxes are less than 1 a -  since 
neither country assigns a positive probability to choosing a tax rate of 1. This is 
formalized in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: When country A is strictly larger than B, there do not exist pure strategy 
equilibria with equal taxes. Furthermore, there are no equilibrium outcomes for which 
either country's tax rate is 1 a - .   25 
 
 
Unlike the symmetric case, there now exists the potential for a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium with unequal taxes.  
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that country A is strictly larger than B. Any pure strategy Nash 
Equilibrium must be such that  A B t t > . The existence of such a pure strategy equilibrium 
requires that A's labor endowment be sufficiently large relative to B's. 
 
Proof: For there to exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which B has the higher tax, 
then it must be that  2 A t , the lowest tax by B for which country A is willing to be the low 
tax country is greater than  1B t % , the highest tax by country A for which country B is willing 
to be the high tax country, i.e. that: 
  1 2 0 B A t t - > % .  (42) 
For this to be true, it must be that: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * *
1 2 , A A A A N N l m l l m l < - .  (43) 
Using (25) for country B, this in turn requires that: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * * * *
1 2 1 , ( ) A A A A B B N N l m l l m l l m l < - <   (44) 
which, since 
* *
A B l l >  and  ( ) 1 lm l is increasing in l ,cannot be true. 
Thus, any pure strategy Nash equilibria must be such that the larger country sets 
the higher tax. For such a thing to occur, a necessary condition is that  1 2 0 A B t t - > %  since 
only if this is true will there exist tax rates for which A is willing to have a discretely   26 
higher tax and B is willing to have a discretely lower tax (i.e. this is necessary for 
1 2 0 A B t t - > ). For  1 2 0 A B t t - > % , it must be that: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * * *
1 2 , B B B B N N l m l l m l < - .  (45) 
When countries are the same in size, this condition fails. Keeping total labor supply 
constant but lowering  B L  also lowers
*
B l , reducing the left hand side of (45) and 
increasing the right hand side. Furthermore, as  B L  approaches zero,
*
B l  does as well. This 
implies that there is a sufficiently large degree of asymmetry for which  1 2 0 A B t t - > . As a 
result, only when asymmetries are sufficiently large is there a possibility of a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium.                Q.E.D. 
  This then predicts that if there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the larger 
country will set the higher tax. It is worth noting that this matches the empirical results of 
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2005) who find that within the OECD relatively 
large countries set higher statutory corporate taxes. van der Hoek (2003) finds a similar 
pattern in European Union taxes. In any case, regardless of whether the Nash equilibria 
are in pure or mixed strategies since best responses do not cross the 45° line there exist 
equilibrium outcomes for which taxes are unequal (and that this is the only possibility for 
pure strategy Nash equilibria). Furthermore, all of these have underprovision of the 
public good. 
 
4. Social Planner's Problem 
  Regardless of whether countries are symmetric or not, since all equilibrium 
outcomes involve tax rates less than 1 a - , they under provide the public good. This   27 
aspect of tax competition is well known. However, in our model, there is also the 
potential that additional distortions arise in the number of firms, relative wages, and/or 
the distribution of firms between countries. To investigate these, we now consider the 
social planner's problem. 
  This social planner maximizes a social welfare function that is the sum of the two 
countries' welfare functions. Specifically, the social planner maximizes: 
  ( ) ( ) , , A A B B A B W v t t v t t = + .  (46) 
by choosing the two countries' tax rates. Using (28) and (29), this reduces to: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 ( ) W a N F N T T N
s s s s s q lm q l m lm l m
- - - = - + - + -   (47) 
where l  and N depend on relative taxes or, if taxes are equal, l  depends on the random 
assignment of the low cost firms. The solution to this is found in our final proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: The social planner's optimum is to set  1 A B t t a = = - . 
 
Proof: First we examine how W behaves in t , i.e. treating  1 T  and  2 T  as fixed. Taking the 







  (48) 
Thus, in order to maximize the real value of worldwide income, the social planner will 
set taxes equal to one another. Note that this does not specify the level of taxes, merely 
their relative values.  
As in the above analysis, taking t  as given, the impact of country k's tax rate on 
its distribution of income is:   28 
  ( )
1 1 (1 ) 1 k k t t a a
- - - - - . 
Since the total impact of a country's tax rate on worldwide welfare is the combination of 
its effect on t  and its effect on its distribution of income, this implies that the social 
planner will set  1 A B t t a = = -  in order to reach an optimum. Furthermore, note that at 
this solution, l  falls out of (47), implying that the social planner is indifferent as to 
which country hosts the low fixed cost firms in equilibrium.       Q.E.D. 
  Thus, the social planner harmonizes taxes and sets them so that the marginal value 
of income is equalized between the public and private sectors. Since the Nash equilibria 
involve outcomes for which taxes are unequal and always has taxes set below 1 a - , this 
makes it clear that all Nash equilibrium outcomes are inefficient relative to the social 
planner's problem. 
  While the underprovision of public goods in the Nash equilibrium is a result 
found in many models of tax competition, in our model it is perhaps less expected that 
the world welfare maximum involves tax harmonization. This is because the number of 
firms in our model is lowest when taxes are equal. With the love for variety Dixit-Stiglitz 
preferences represent, one might expect that the social planner would implement unequal 
taxes, thereby creating a low-cost location and encouraging entry. However, creating this 
low cost country also entails creating a high cost country. This lowers the real income in 
country 2 sufficiently to destroy any benefits the new varieties create. This is also the root 
of an externality imposed by the low tax country in the Nash equilibrium since it does not 
internalize the impact of this on country 2's citizens. 
 
5. Alternative Assumptions   29 
The above results are robust to several alternative assumptions. In this section, we 
consider several alternative assumptions to the baseline model. 
First, we consider alternative firm distributions when taxes are equal. One 
alternative would be to assume that when taxes are equal that the relatively large country 
hosts the low productivity firms (thereby guaranteeing that under equal taxes more firms 
locate in the large country). In this case, country B would be willing to match A's tax rate 
for intermediate tax rate levels. Nevertheless, country A will always benefit by setting its 
tax marginally below B's instead of matching it. As a result, A's best response destroys the 
possibility of pure strategy equilibria with equal taxes. A second alternative firm 
distribution would be to deviate from the distribution of Figure 1 and instead distribute 
firms so that the average profits of firms in each country are the same, that average 
productivities are the same, or that the number of firms are equal. In any case, however, 
by marginally undercutting the other nation's tax rate, a country again creates a discrete 
shift in its income by attracting only the most productive (and profitable) firms. Thus 
again there would not exist pure strategy Nash equilibria with equal taxes. Furthermore it 
is still a best response to set a tax rate of 1 a -  only when the other country sets its tax 
equal to 1. Since the social planner is indifferent to how firms are distributed when 
1 A B t t a = = - , these alternatives do not change the solution to the social planners 
problem. 
Second, we can change the assumption that wage income and profits are taxed 
equally. If we instead allow for different tax rates, then because labor is exogenously 
endowed, a wage tax is a non-distortionary lump sum tax. If wage income is sufficiently 
large so that enough tax revenues can be generated for public use, then it is optimal for   30 
governments to use the wage tax to transfer income between private and public sectors 
and use its profit tax to attract the desired number of firms. This then separates the need 
to balance t  against income allocation. Given the above results for a country's preferred 
t , it is clear that this leads to a race to the bottom which, unless taxes are bounded from 
below, implies that profit taxes shoot towards negative infinity.
 It is worth noting that in 
this case, if both profit tax rates are bounded at the same point, that this equilibrium is 
efficient relative to the social planner's problem. This is because the minimum tax rate 
effectively harmonizes profit taxes and wage taxes distribute income optimally. 
Third, we assumed that firm profits accrue entirely to local income. This is akin to 
not allowing investors in one country to invest in the other. However, this strong of an 
assumption is not necessary for our results. If we instead replace it with one assuming 
that the majority of a firm's profits go to local income, all of our results hold. This is 
because, when taxes are equal, it still strictly benefits a country to undercut the other's tax 
because of the boost to income this provides. The primary difference is that the discrete 
gain from doing so is smaller than before because the country only keeps a majority of 
the profit earned by these high profit firms. 
Fourth, we can consider best responses when firms are able to geographically 
fragment their activities, i.e. become multinationals. In the literature on FDI, there are 
two broad classes of multinational firms: vertical firms that engage in headquarters 
activity in one country and production in another (Helpman, 1984) and horizontal firms 
that have their headquarters in one country but produce in multiple countries (Markusen, 
1984). Consistent with this literature, let the location of the fixed cost represents the 
headquarter activity. In our model, as noted by Markusen (1984), the absence of trade   31 
costs and constant returns to scale in production eliminate the need for multiple 
production facilities.
18 Thus, if multinationals exist in our model, they are of the vertical 
type.
19 An important difference between our setting and the standard one is that in the 
typical model of vertical FDI, multinationals arise due to factor price differences across 
countries. Typically, headquarter services are skilled-labor intensive relative to 
production. Therefore if countries differ in their relative endowments and factor prices 
are not equalized through trade, then the skilled-labor abundant country hosts the 
headquarter activity and the other country hosts production. In our model, however, there 
is only one factor of production. Nevertheless, as discussed above, when taxes differ 
there can still exist wage differences across countries. This provides a motivation for 
vertical FDI. 
In order to explore the implications of vertical FDI, it is necessary to make some 
assumptions regarding tax jurisdictions. Specifically, we assume that countries only levy 
taxes on firms headquartered within their borders. We also assume that the parent part of 
the multinational (i.e. where the fixed cost occurs) pays its subsidiary (where production 
occurs)  k w  per unit of output where k is the country hosting production. This amounts to 
assuming that there is no ability to transfer price.
20 As a result, the only tax base for a 
given firm is found in the country hosting its headquarters.
21 
                                                 
18 In fact, in this setting if there are costs to building each production facility, only single production-
location firms will exist.  
19 Evidence of vertical FDI is found by Davies (forthcoming), Braconier, Norback, and Urban (2005), 
Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005), Yeaple (2003), and Feinberg and Keane (2001). 
20 We discuss relaxing this momentarily. 
21 An advantage of this is that it eliminates the need to consider double tax issues, the strategic aspects of 
which are considered by Bond and Samuelson (1989), Janeba (1995), and Davies (2003). We leave a more 
realistic treatment of this issue to future work.   32 
  When taxes are equal, as before, wages will be equal. Therefore there is no need 
for firms to fragment their activities and all of the properties above hold. Now suppose 
that  1 2 t t < , which, for labor markets to clear, implies that  1 2 w w > . In this case, all firms 
will seek to locate their production in the low cost country 2 since there are no tax 
advantages to locating production in country 1. We assume that the labor supply in 2 is 
large enough to handle this. Unlike production, there are advantages to locating the 
headquarters in the low-tax country 1. The primary difference this causes is that the 
indifferent firm l  now pays  2 w  on production costs regardless of where it locates its 
headquarters. Thus, (12) becomes: 
 
1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) a N a a N a
s s s s q l tq l
- - - -     - = -    .  (49) 
Once again, this implies that low productivity firms will find it advantageous to locate 
their headquarters in country 2 because the tax savings are small compared to the wage 
savings on the fixed cost. Furthermore, this yields the same equation determining the last 
firm to enter ((9)). Now, however, since the cost advantages to locating in country 2 are 
smaller, the indifferent firm has a higher index than in the baseline model. 
  Despite this change in the equilibrium l , there is still a discrete income benefit to 
undercutting the other nation's tax rate for the same reasons as described above. In fact, 
since FDI increases the profits of high productivity firms, doing so attracts even more 
profitable firms than it did before. This then provides a greater income boost than in the 
baseline model therefore the introduction of FDI only increases the severity of the race to 
the bottom tax competition. Thus, as in the baseline model, there are no pure strategy 
Nash equilibria with equal taxes and all equilibrium outcomes will have taxes less than 
1 a - . Since the equilibrium with vertical FDI is the same as the baseline case when taxes   33 
are equal, allowing vertical FDI does not change the solution to the social planner's 
problem, implying that all Nash equilibrium outcomes are again inefficient. 
  Finally, it is important to recognize that alternative assumptions on the social 
welfare function can result in tax harmonization being undesirable from the social 
planner's perspective. First, if countries have different a 's then harmonization creates 
distortions for at least one of them vis-à-vis its income distribution. As such, the social 
planner may choose to set differing tax rates in the two locations. Second, if country's 
welfares are unequally weighted in the social welfare function, the social planner has two 
reasons to maintain different tax rates. The first of these is that the social planner is no 
longer indifferent over which country hosts the high productivity firms. By setting its 
favored nation's tax just under the other, this ensures that its favored nation will host 
these firms, providing a boost to the social welfare function. Furthermore, by lowering 
the favored nation's tax relative to the others, this benefits that country (at the expense of 
the other) by sending even more firms to it. Thus, using unequal tax rates is a method of 
shifting income from the high tax to the low tax country. Nevertheless, this is an 
inefficient way of doing so since lump sum transfers could be used to shift this income 
without the distortions unequal taxes create. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  The goal of this paper has been to incorporate recent innovations from the trade 
literature on mobile firms into a tax competition model. In particular, we have modeled 
competition between governments for heterogeneous, imperfectly competitive firms with 
endogenous entry. These new features of the model highlight a heretofore unrecognized   34 
aspect of tax competition – that it can encourage excessive firm entry. This then adds to 
the typical woe of tax competition, the underprovision of a public good. Furthermore, our 
framework allows us to study the extent of this problem even in a model where firms 
choose a single location, something that cannot generally be done in other models with 
discrete investment. 
  An implication of our results is that tax coordination, or at least de facto 
coordination by imposing a minimum tax rate across countries, can improve welfare 
relative to the Nash equilibrium. This then lends some support to the drive for such 
coordination by the OECD (1998, 2000) or the European Union (see van der Hoek, 2003, 
for a discussion). While there are certainly reasons to caution against harmonization 
(such as varying preferences over public versus private consumption), we hope that our 
results add further depth to this lively and important debate.   35 
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Figure 3: Best Response of Country 2 
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